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Characteristics of the Ultraorthodox 
community
Israeli1society is mosaic in nature, and is principally 
divided into the Jewish population (approximately 
1 ‘God is telling us something’: Deri says 70% of Israel’s virus 
cases are Haredim, The Times of Israel, 10.05.2020, www.
timesofisrael.com.
74%), Arab population (21%) and others (5%)2. 
The Jewish majority can be divided further into 
numerous subgroups according to ethnic criteria 
(descent), and religious and political criteria. This 
is manifested not only in Israel’s plainly visible 
cultural diversity, but also for example in the 
2 ‘Israel’s population at 9,136,000 on the eve of 2020’, The 
Jerusalem Post, 1.01.2020, www.jpost.com.
Ultraorthodox Jews in Israel – epidemic as a measure of challenges
Marek Matusiak
In Israel as in other countries, when the COVID-19 epidemic surfaced it exacerbated the existing divi-
sions and tensions in society. A group that came under severe attack from the public was the Jewish 
Ultraorthodox population (the Haredi). This was due to disregard on the part of certain ultraorthodox 
groups of the restrictions imposed in response to the epidemic and an exceptionally high infection 
rate in that community – as much as 70% of cases recorded from February until May this year affected 
members of that community.1
This non-conformity with the regulations by some Haredi (in fact a distinct minority) resonated broadly 
because it was an element of a decades-long heated dispute over the state’s approach towards the 
group and its place in Israeli society. Over the years, the issue has repeatedly caused severe shockwaves 
(including collapse of government coalitions). The stance adopted by the Haredi during the initial 
phase of the epidemic provided critics of the Haredi with new arguments that they are de facto a law 
unto themselves, and as a result are becoming increasingly socially and politically problematic. While 
COVID-19 cannot be expected to significantly change the subjects under debate, the arguments used 
in the debate, or the balance of power, it will make the dispute even more complex than before the 
epidemic and lead to greater polarisation. This will further complicate Israel’s efforts to meet challenges 
posed by the rapid increase in the community’s population. The members of the community wish to be 
separate from the rest of society, mistrust state structures, and make a negligible contribution to the 
national economy or for example to defence, being practically exempt from military service. At the same 
time, they are gaining more and more influence over public life due to powerful political representation.
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political landscape, in which there are a range 
of formations associated with a very specifically 
and permanently defined group of voters (such 
as the Russian-speaking population). 
The Ultraorthodox Jewish community is made 
up in total of approximately 1.1 million people, 
represents approximately 12% of the population 
(thought to be approximately 1% in 1948), and 
is one of the most distinctive groups in Israel’s 
social landscape. The Haredi primarily inhabit the 
densely populated districts of Jerusalem, Bene 
Beraq (outside Tel Aviv), Bet Shemesh (outside 
Jerusalem) and many smaller towns. To outsiders, 
their separate identity from the rest of society 
is plain to see. They are distinguished by their 
historical dress, live in tight clusters, remain at 
a distance from the secular community, and lead 
a collective way of life governed by religious law. 
Community life is centred around institutions 
such as the educational institution (yeshiva) or 
the synagogue. 
Rejection of the secular world and secular educa-
tion, and creation of enclaves and, more broadly, 
a kind of cultural introversion, make the Haredi 
stand out from other groups of religious Israelis 
whose religious devotion does not prevent them 
from functioning in the secular world or exclude 
Israeli patriotism. The religious Zionists, who com-
bine a high level of religious practice and radical 
nationalism, contrast with the Haredi the most 
in this regard, and at the same time have an ex-
traordinarily powerful impact on public discourse 
in Israel. One of the ways in which the religious 
Zionists’ radical nationalism is exhibited is the 
active settlement movement on the West Bank. 
For the Haredi, it is vital to be separate from the 
world to protect continuous study of the Torah 
from the destructive influence of modernity. In 
this sense, they consider themselves not only as 
not shirking their responsibilities towards the 
rest of society; they are the de facto custodians 
of true Jewishness, which they preserve for the 
rest of the Jewish world3.
3 See N. Leon, The Haredi-Secular Debate and the Shas 
Approach [in:] Handbook of Israel: Major Debates, vol. 1, 
Berlin – Boston 2016.
The separate identity of Ultraorthodox people 
from the rest of society is also clear from statistics. 
The Haredi have a high level of population growth. 
On average, there are seven children per woman, 
while the average for the overall Jewish popula-
tion in Israel (and the Arab population as well) is 
three4. As a result, the Haredi are a community 
that is distinctly younger than the rest of society: 
almost 60% are aged below 19, while only 3% are 
over 65. Among other Jews, 30% are aged below 
19, and 15% are aged over 65. If the current de-
mographic trends continue, the community will 
double in number within fifteen years5. At the 
same time, despite the high percentage of people 
of productive age, only half of Ultraorthodox men, 
and three quarters of women, are gainfully em-
ployed on any basis6. The low level of occupational 
activity and lack of secular education mean that 
the Haredi mostly live moderately or in poverty. 
In turn, cultural differences are demonstrated for 
example by the fact that compared to the rest 
of Israel’s Jewish citizens, among Ultraorthodox 
members of society, the number of people who 
use the Internet (often only at work or with filters 
switched on) or hold a driving licence is two times 
lower, and the number who travel abroad is three 
times lower7. These differences continue to be 
highly visible, even though over the last decade 
there has been a significant increase in each of 
these categories among the Haredi.
However, despite the highly perceptible boundary 
distinguishing the Ultraorthodox community from 
the rest of Israeli society, which may give the im-
pression that they are homogenous, the group is 
4 See Y. Stern, ‘Who Are The Ultra-Orthodox Jews Of Israel?’, 
Forward, 8.01.2018, www.forward.com; O. Aderet, ‘For the 
First Time in Israel’s History, Jewish Fertility Rate Surpasses 
That of Arabs’, Haaretz, 31.12.2019, www.haaretz.com.
5 G. Malach, L. Cahaner, 2019 Statistical Report on Ultra-
Orthodox Society in Israel: Highlights, The Israel Democracy 
Institute, 24.12.2019, en.idi.org.il.
6 Ibidem.
7 49% of adult Ultraorthodox people use the Internet, 44% 
hold a driving licence, and 17% have been abroad. The same 
figures are 89%, 81% and 51% for other Jewish citizens of 
Israel. For: ibidem.
The Ultraorthodox Jewish commu-
nity is one of the most distinctive 
groups in Israel’s social landscape.
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exceptionally diverse, does not have centralised 
leadership, and is split along numerous dividing 
lines. These dividing lines may reflect descent, 
a cultivated religious tradition, membership of 
a particular religious community, or the follow-
ing of a specific spiritual leader. In addition, the 
Haredi do not hold uniform views on fundamental 
issues related to world view, such as their attitude 
towards the secular world, modernity, or even 
the State of Israel. With regard to the latter, the 
attitudes range from complete rejection to full 
affirmation, with numerous positions in between8. 
The most fundamental distinctions within the Ul-
traorthodox community – such as differentiation 
between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Judaic rites, or 
between the Chasidic and Litvak communities 
(within the Ashkenazi rite) – are common knowl-
edge, but most of them for example differences 
between individual strands of Chasidism are only 
intelligible to the people concerned.
In political life, the Haredi are represented by two 
formations – United Torah Judaism (Ashkenazi) 
and Shas (Sephardic). Thanks to a disciplined voter 
group, these formations regularly gain a combined 
vote of between 10% and 15% of seats in the 
Knesset. They do not aspire to gaining independ-
ent rule or to a major impact on aspects of state 
policy that do not directly affect the communities 
they represent. Instead, they focus on protecting 
the material and symbolic interests of their sup-
porters, for instance providing social benefits 
and protecting young men from being drafted 
into the army (Ultraorthodox women are exempt 
a priori). This approach makes the Ultraorthodox 
parties relatively predictable, and therefore a sta-
ble and attractive coalition partner (especially in 
a situation in which there are traditionally gov-
ernment coalitions made up of multiple parties). 
As a result, one or both of these formations have 
8 L. Cahaner, The Ultra-Orthodox Community on the 
Conservatism-Modernism Spectrum, The Israel Democracy 
Institute, 31.05.2019, en.idi.org.il. 
helped form seven out of eight governments in 
Israel in the last twenty years. In the first phase 
of the epidemic, Ultraorthodox politicians Yaakov 
Litzman and Aryeh Deri held the posts of minister 
of health and interior minister. When the new 
government was formed on 17 May, the former 
was appointed minister of construction, and the 
letter remained in his current post. 
Course of the epidemic among 
the Haredi
The first case of infection with SARS-CoV-2 in Israel 
was discovered on 21 February. Only a few days 
later, the authorities began introducing restric-
tions on cross-border individual movement, and 
from the first half of March far-reaching restric-
tions on public gatherings, commerce, and oper-
ations of educational institutions, and regarding 
lockdown, came into force. The epidemic-related 
restrictions became most stringent at the begin-
ning of April and remained in that form until the 
beginning of May.
Even though the two ministries crucial for the fight 
against COVID-19 were headed by Ultraorthodox 
politicians, who in theory had especially close ties 
to their communities – the Haredi were distinctly 
tardy in their response, and some intentionally 
ignored the restrictions and continued studying 
in the yeshivas, holding prayers collectively, at-
tending weddings and funerals, and so on. When, 
in mid-March, the state authorities announced 
that schools would be closed, the top religious 
authoritative figures of the Ultraorthodox world 
protested against the closure of the yeshivas, ar-
guing that constant study of the Torah ensures 
the community spiritual protection. It was not 
until approximately two weeks later that there 
was a change in the rabbis’ position9, and a vast 
majority of the Haredi complied with the gov-
ernment decisions. There were further cases of 
serious breach of epidemic-related restrictions and 
of clashes with police through April and May, but 
9 ‘PSAK HALACHA: HaRav Chaim Kanievsky: “Assur To Daven 
In A Minyan’, Din Rodeif To Anyone Who Violates Health 
Ministry Directives”’, The Yeshiva World, 29.03.2020, 
www.theyeshivaworld.com.
The Haredi may give the impression 
that they are homogenous, but the 
group is exceptionally diverse and 
does not have centralised leadership.
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these were confined to local areas and concerned 
a minority (although reported on by the media). 
For example, on the eleventh and twelfth of May, 
photographs were circulated in the Israeli media 
of large groups of Ultraorthodox people gather-
ing in public places to light bonfires to celebrate 
Lag B’Omer. This was severely criticised by Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who said that the 
sanitary regulations would be more stringently 
enforced in the Haredi districts, and this would 
also involve dispersal of crowds by force10. 
As a result of the neglect and violations described 
above, the effect of the epidemic on the Ultraor-
thodox community was disproportionate to its 
percentage share in society and low average age. 
Seventy percent of those infected were Haredi 
(figures for mid-May) and their residential areas 
were the main points of outbreak of Coronavirus 
in the country. At the beginning of April, the city 
of Bene Beraq – the ninth largest city in Israel, 
and the city with the second highest number of 
cases – was placed in lockdown, and a range of 
Ultraorthodox districts in Jerusalem followed11. 
At the same time, other Haredi concentrations, 
such as the cities of Bet Shemesh, Elad, or Modi’in 
Illit, each recorded more cases than Tel Aviv, even 
though the total number of residents of these 
cities is only approximately half of that of Tel Aviv12.
There are many reasons for the Haredi in Israel (like 
the Ultraorthodox communities in the US or UK 
as well, in fact) being affected more by COVID-19 
than the rest of society. First of all, the epidemic 
spread quickly due to many conditions related 
to the community’s lifestyle: the residential estates 
are among the most densely populated in Israel, 
there is a high number of children per family, and 
dwellings are small. In addition, life in the group 
revolves around communal religious rituals, which 
10 ‘PM Netanyahu Speaks with Senior Officials Following 
Violation of the Rules and Lighting of Bonfires that Led 
to Large-Scale Gatherings in Jerusalem and Beit Shemesh’, 
Prime Minister’s Office, 12.05.2020, www.gov.il/en.
11  ‘Jerusalem ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods go into lockdown 
to stop virus spread’, The Times of Israel, 12.04.2020, 
www.timesofisrael.com.
12 ‘Three ultra-Orthodox towns surpass Tel Aviv in active 
coronavirus cases’, The Times of Israel, 23.04.2020,www.
timesofisrael.com.
have to be observed for the group to function 
properly. The slow response to instructions given 
by the authorities was also due to a high level of 
isolation from the outside world, which means 
not only not using secular information sources, 
but also not making use of devices through which 
information could have been obtained, such as 
smartphones, computers, or television. Equally, 
most Haredi are mistrustful of state institutions 
and fear attempts at outside interference in the life 
of the community. The issue that is most contro-
versial and most difficult to judge is the personal 
accountability of the community’s spiritual and 
political authoritative figures. A lot of evidence 
suggests that initially the most important of these, 
for example Rabbi Chaim Kaniewski from Bene 
Beraq, failed to appreciate the scale of the danger, 
and their opposition to closure of religious schools 
or to the stopping of collective prayer de facto de-
layed the community’s response by approximately 
two weeks and made it easier for the epidemic 
to spread in its residential areas. Ultraorthodox 
ministers in Netanyahu’s government, primarily 
the head of the ministry of health, Litzman, also 
seems to have underestimated the threat and pri-
marily focused on protecting the community from 
restrictions that were too invasive in its lifestyle13. 
According to media reports, minister Litzman 
himself systematically violated social distancing 
rules for instance by attending group prayer. He 
was diagnosed with Coronavirus at the beginning 
of April, forcing Prime Minister Netanyahu and 
many other key government figures to go into 
quarantine.
Some secular commentators in Israel suggest that 
the Haredi themselves were surprised by the scale 
to which the community was unprepared for this 
emergency, and this caused confidence in the 
13 ‘Ministers Litzman, Deri ask to soften closure on cities’, 
Arutz Sheva – Israel National News, 4.06.2020, www.
israelnationalnews.com. 
The effect of the epidemic on the 
Ultraorthodox community was dis-
proportionate to its percentage 
share in society and low average age.
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religious and political leadership to waver. They 
further suggest that in the long term this could 
speed up individualisation processes, and thus 
provide conditions favourable for Ultraorthodox 
people to become closer to mainstream Israeli 
community life. This was said to be confirmed 
among other things by telecommunications pro-
viders’ statistics, showing an increase in Internet 
use in Haredi residential settlements as a result of 
the epidemic14. At the moment it is not possible 
to verify this claim. However it does not seem 
to take account of how firmly culture models 
are rooted in the Ultraorthodox community, and 
could be an example of wishful thinking on the 
part of secular Israelis.
Haredi as a political issue
The controversy surrounding the stance taken 
by the Ultraorthodox community towards the 
epidemic is an element of a discussion that has 
continued for many years on the state’s approach 
to the Haredi and their place in Israeli society. 
This is a discussion concerning both identity and 
politics, and intensifies before almost every par-
liamentary election in Israel. A range of secular 
formations, on the left and right alike, have pro-
posed that the state should adopt a firmer policy 
towards the community, for instance by making 
them subject to military service and by intro-
ducing secular subjects to religious schools, and 
forcing them to be more active professionally (for 
example by cutting funding for religious educa-
tion). A major portion of secular voters see the 
Haredi as an unreasonable burden on the rest of 
society, especially in view of the rapid increase 
in the community’s population, as they do not 
make a contribution to the country’s security and 
prosperity in proportion to their numbers, and 
also obtain significant grants from the budget. 
Meanwhile, despite public and political pressure 
to limit the autonomy of the Ultraorthodox, the 
strength of their political representation makes 
it extremely hard to realise significant changes of 
any kind in the state’s approach. As a result, issues 
14 T. Cohen, S. Scheer, ‘Israel’s ultra-Orthodox Jews take 
to internet in coronavirus lockdown’, Reuters, 23.04.2020, 
www.reuters.com.
concerning the Haredi (in particular military ser-
vice) regularly send shockwaves across the Israel 
political scene, and caused government coalitions 
to collapse in 2012 and 2018. An inability to act 
or lack of political will on the part of successive 
governments to create conditions for the Haredi 
to share with the rest of society responsibility 
for the country’s defence and prosperity cause 
frustration and growing hostility on the part of 
many secular citizens. An epidemic in which Is-
raelis conforming to the lockdown rules saw on 
television that Haredi continued to study in ye-
shiva or organise weddings caused the situation 
to deteriorate further. The unsympathetic and 
fierce reaction towards Ultraorthodox people is 
encouraged by the fact that the entire community 
is perceived as a uniform organism and by an 
inability to identify the extreme strands within 
it responsible for the most blatant breaches of 
the epidemic-related restrictions. The delay in 
response on the part of the Haredi to the out-
break of Coronavirus also caused fear among the 
secular elements of society that the Haredi would 
spread the epidemic beyond their own residential 
settlements. One clear indication of this tendency 
was the situation that arose at the beginning of 
April, when the authorities of the city of Ramat 
Gan, which borders the Ultraorthodox Bene Beraq, 
decided by themselves to begin installing fences 
separating the two towns. The level of tension 
was plain from a statement made by President 
Re’uwen Riwlin on 5 April, denouncing attempts 
to castigate the Haredi, and emphasising that the 
entire community could not be blamed for the 
conduct of a few people.
The state and religion in Israel 
The discussion on the subject of the place of the 
Haredi in Israeli society is in fact only one aspect 
of a much broader debate on the relationship 
between the state and religion, and the country’s 
identity, which dates back to before the creation 
of the State of Israel, and in a deeper sense – dis-
putes over the definition of Jewish identity that 
existed among the diaspora in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. Despite numerous references to biblical 
tradition, the Jewish national movement is histori-
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cally a secular movement, and the state founded in 
1948 was also intended to be established as such. 
Meanwhile, in 1947, the leader of the movement, 
and subsequently long-serving prime minister of 
Israel, David Ben Gurion, entered into a political 
contract with religious parties, called the ‘status 
quo’ arrangement, in an effort to avoid a situation 
in which any part of Jewish community in Palestine 
refused to provide support for a proposal for the 
state’s independence. Under the contract, in the 
future state, the Shabbat would be a day of rest, 
kitchens in public institutions would keep kosher, 
matters concerning marital status would be reg-
ulated according to religious law, and religious 
education would continue to be autonomous. 
Ben Gurion also agreed that students attending 
religious schools (at that time approximately 400 
per year) would be exempt from military service. 
Although the ‘status quo’ was never formally 
enacted, it became the foundation governing 
the relationship between the state and religion 
in Israel. References to it, whether direct or indi-
rect, can be found in many coalition agreements, 
and elsewhere. The reaching of a compromise 
and the need to preserve the fragile balance be-
tween the various strands within Israeli society 
had far-reaching implications. One result was that 
Israel does not have a constitution, and another 
is that many especially sensitive issues, such as 
the definition of the Shabbat, and thus whether 
public transport and trade is permitted, have 
never been settled in statute, and are regulated 
indirectly or in lower-level legislation. Because 
these matters have not been resolved definitive-
ly, Israel is regularly engulfed in heated debates 
on subjects not addressed or not addressed in 
sufficient detail in the ‘status quo’, or where the 
established arrangement is contested. These is-
sues include military service for the Haredi, the 
rules for recognition by the state of conversion 
to Judaism, introduction of civil weddings and 
divorce, and the rules for observing the Shabbat. 
In almost all of these issues the law as it stands 
at a particular time is tested or contested by one 
of the parties to the dispute. This often causes 
social or political turmoil, and in many cases the 
conflicts are dealt with on an interim basis by way 
of Supreme Court decisions. The discussion on the 
place of the Jewish religion in the life of the state 
intensifies as the face of Israeli society changes 
and the political and demographic dominance 
of the secular elements of society fades (which 
has been fading since the 1970s). Today, four 
main groups can be identified in that society. The 
largest group, which is historically the dominant 
group, is secular Jews (approximately 40%), while 
the others are religious Jews (and these include 
Ultraorthodox Jews), traditionalist Jews (who only 
nurture certain elements of Jewish tradition) and 
the non-Jewish population (mainly Arabs) – each 
approximately 20%15. Although the secular ele-
ment of society remains the largest, it does not 
have an absolute majority and is spread across 
a very broad political spectrum. Forecasts show 
however that its ‘currently holdings’ will continue 
to decline. 
President Re’uwen Riwlin made a reference to the 
demographic situation outlined above and its 
political implications in his symbolic address at 
Herzliya University in 2015, when he talked about 
the ‘four tribes’ that make up Israel’s modern 
society. At that time, he appealed for a departure 
from the perception of society in terms of the 
secular majority and the remaining minorities, 
and to look to a vision in which four main demo-
graphic groups share responsibility for the state, 
and at the same time retain the right to separate 
identities and lifestyles. 
Summary
The course that the epidemic has taken in Israel, 
and the disproportionately high rate of infection 
among the Haredi, not only confirmed the scale 
of tension between the Ultraorthodox and secular 
elements of society, but have exacerbated them 
15 K.J. Starr, D. Masci, ‘In Israel, Jews are united by homeland 
but divided into very different groups’, Pew Research Center, 
8.03.2016, www.pewresearch.org.
The discussion on the subject of the 
place of the Haredi in Israeli society 
is one aspect of the debate on the 
relationship between the state and 
religion.
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further. This provided critics of Ultraorthodox 
people with arguments for condemning them as 
a fanatic community that is above the law, and, 
in circumstances such as an epidemic, potentially 
dangerous to their fellow citizens. Due to the fact 
that the situation caused by Coronavirus is so 
compatible with the negative stereotype (already 
established) of the community, it will probably 
place an additional, long-term burden on its image, 
even if the Haredi do not give their opponents 
cause for criticism in later stages of the epidemic. 
As a result, conducting a debate in which there is 
already severe polarisation, and which is becoming 
more and more urgent for demographic reasons, 
on finding a modus vivendi enabling the Haredi 
to retain their cultural autonomy but also requir-
ing them to bear the appropriate portion of civil 
obligations, will become even more difficult. At 
present it is not possible to answer the question 
about the long-term effects of the epidemic in 
the Haredi community, and possible strengthening 
of individualistic tendencies within that commu-
nity, bringing them closer to mainstream Israeli 
society. In the interim, however, the epidemic 
will certainly raise the temperature in the debate, 
reinforce stereotypes, and hamper the reaching 
of a compromise.
